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Barnett: Commentary

COMMENTARY
Frank R. Barnett*
As a non-lawyer, I'd like to confine my remarks to the
relationship of the concept of law to violence and to military
strategy. That may seem like a curious mixed bag to you, but
I hope to demonstrate it is not entirely irrelevant.
A hundred years ago, a discussion of comparative law and
contrasting systems, conducted here in Columbia, South Carolina, would have belonged largely to the realm of the academic.
Obviously, in the Nineteenth Century, when America was still
sheltered behind her vast ocean moats, Russian and Chinese
concepts of law and society would have had virtually no impact upon the lives of our own people. But technology has
shrunk both of our oceans to approximately the width of the
Rio Grande; and Columbia, South Carolina, is now, in terms
of real time, about as close to Moscow as Paris was to Berlin
at the beginning of World War I. Therefore, the Brezhnev
Doctrine, and Mao's dictum that political power grows out of
the barrel of a gun, are scarcely ivory tower abstractions any
more.
In the name of "socialist legality," armored divisions do,
in fact, cross frontiers. Under the rationale of support for
"just" wars, political terrorism and revolutionary techniques
are now exported from one continent to another.
We live, in short, in a world in which ideology in the communist states is commingled with western concepts of law;
when ideology, on the world stage, stimulates violence; and
when low-level violence can, in turn, be supported by highlevel military capability.
It seems to me that there are interesting questions, therefore, for interdisciplinary research in the field of international
law, relating to the interrelationships of law and ideology, law
and foreign propaganda, law and political warfare, law and
economic warfare.
*Frank R. Barnett, Rhodes Scholar, LL.D. University of South Carolina;
President, National Strategy Information Center, Inc. New York City; Consultant, Standing Committee on Education About Communism, American Bar
Association; summer school faculty, The National War College (1959-1967);

co-editor, Peace and War in the Modern Age, Doubleday Anchor Edition.
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The point that has always interested me about Lenin, who
had had some familiarity with law himself, is that he introduced into the Twentieth Century the doctrine of non-military
warfare as a means of out flanking the rule of law or the
status quo. I repeat the term, because it doesn't make sense in
English-"non-military warfare." By that, Lenin meant the
professional use of techniques of propaganda, agitation, and
political warfare to overcome the defenses of status quo societies. And it seems to me that while the cast of characters in
Moscow may change, the script writer remains the same.
Lenin's principles and Lenin's doctrine seem to be imbedded,
even today, in the speeches of major communist leaders and
in much of the thinking that appears in Soviet political and
military journals.
How might "world law" be affected by the changing military balance? Obviously, as the Soviet Union increases its
sheer military capability at home, it has the means to back up
the export of revolutionary Leninism or non-military warfare
to other parts of the world. Most civilians, certainly of my
generation, have been brought up to take for granted that the
United States, whatever else it lacks, will always possess those
scientific, industrial and military capabilities that would enable this country to defend its own vital interests and/or to
come to the support of small allies. We can no longer take that
assumption for granted!
When President Kennedy faced down Khrushchev at the
time of the Cuban missile crisis, we had roughly a six-to-one
advantage in strategic nuclear weapons. That ratio has now
changed to a three-to-two balance against us. And, in addition to that, the Soviet Navy is now clearly second in the
world. It far surpasses the navy of Great Britain. This means
that a Soviet Navy will be able to bring to bear Soviet conventional military power, possibly even in the Caribbean, or in
Latin America, which the Soviets refer to as the "strategic
rear" of the United States.
The landlocked Bear of Czarist days has learned to swim!
The Bear can swim into virtually any ocean and any sea. He
can swim under cover of a Soviet nuclear umbrella that can
deter our deterrent, which means that Leninist techniques of
revolutionary violence, seeded into, let's say, Latin America,
can now enjoy direct support from Soviet military capability.
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It seems to me this is going to have much to do with the
collision of concepts of "law" on the world stage.
I want to leave one question with the audience, which relates to one aspect of Soviet law, mainly the Brezhnev Doctrine, which was used to justify Moscow's occupation of
Czechoslovakia. When Soviet armor moved into Prague in
August of 1968, even those people in the West who had been
busy building bridges of friendship to Moscow were temporarily dismayed by what seemed to be a return to neo-Stalinism. But six months is about as long as the Western democracies can remember communist duplicity; already all of the lessons of Czechoslovakia are being swept under the rug of
d6tente politics.
To me, there were certain lessons from the Soviet invasion that bear on our own security and that are relevant to
any discussion of international "law" or contrasting systems.
Lesson number one - When the vital interests of the
Soviet Union are at stake, the people in Moscow care absolutely
nothing about world opinion. The commissars are sophisticated and clever men. They understand world opinion. They
knew, undoubtedly, they would be temporarily criticized for
invading a small ally. They knew, also, that the accent is on
the concept "temporary." World opinion is a fickle and neurotic lover whose attention is quickly diverted elsewhere.
Those who feel that Russia can be restrained by appeals to
"world law" or world public opinion have the burden of proof
on their shoulders, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
But there is a further lesson, even more relevant. You
recall that, in the fortnight preceding the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, the world was astonished to see virtually the
entire Russian Politburo move by special train down to the
borders of Czechoslovakia, there to negotiate with Dubcek and
his colleagues in the Czech Cabinet. The optimists in the West
rejoiced at the sight of a great power behaving "responsibly."
Indeed, some people said, "You see, Russia is humbling itself
in the search for peace. As a great power, Russia could have
summoned the Czechs to Moscow. Instead, the Soviets have
moved their own Politburo down to Czechoslovakia, to prove
their good intentions." Of course, while the Politburo "negotiated" with Dubcek, the Red Army marshals were putting their
finishing touches on the invasion plan. (You don't plan an in-
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vasion in the last twenty-four hours; it takes several weeks to
work it out.)
I can't predict the future any better than anyone else, but
I leave you with a question: Do you believe that Russia, which
under the doctrine of Brezhnev was quite prepared to betray
a small communist ally with a military stab in the back, would
be prepared to treat a capitalist adversary with more courtesy
or "legal" consideration if and when Soviet military science
should give Moscow an advantage over the United States comparable to that which Moscow had over the Czechs in August,
1968?
I don't know the answer to that question, but it seems to
me that we should not leave it entirely and unilaterally to those
who formulate the Brezhnev doctrine of "law" to decide.
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